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Introduction 
South Korean and Taiwanese brands have long been household names. Today, however, the names 
of transnational companies (TNCs) from an increasingly diverse set of emerging and developing 
economies are regularly making if not the dinner table conversation then at least the headlines of the 
international business press. This reflects that companies such as Mittal and Tata (India), China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Haier and Lenovo (PRC), Embraer (Brazil), 
SAPMiller (South Africa), and Cemex (Mexico) are foraying ever deeper into the international 
economy and increasingly investing abroad.  
 
Even though FDI usually constitutes only a minor part of countries’ total capital formation, the 
relationships between FDI and economic growth, welfare, and industrial upgrading in developing 
countries have been the object of long and extensive treatment in the literature. However, the 
literature has overwhelmingly focused on the impact of outward FDI from developed countries into 
recipient developing countries. Much less analyzed has been the increasingly important 
phenomenon of outward FDI (OFDI) from the developing countries themselves, be it into 
developed or into other developing countries. Apart from a few early pioneering studies (Lecraw 
1977; Lall 1983; Wells 1983; Agarwal 1985) only few studies have been made so far of outward 
investment from emerging and developing economies. This is in spite of the fact that the value of 
outward FDI stock from developing countries reached USD859 billion in 2003, up from USD129 
billion in 1990, and has increased 11 times since 1985. 
 
A limited number of recent studies do exist, though (e.g. Cai 1999; Lecraw 1993; van Hoesel 1999; 
Tolentino 1993; Andreff 2003; Chudnovsky  and López 2000; Bulatov 1998, Yeung 2000). 
Furthermore, academic interest in the subject picked up considerably with the publication of 
UNCTAD’s 2006 World Investment Report, which was dedicated to the subject of FDI from 
developing and transition economies. The report was succeeded by a number of journal special 
issues (e.g. JIBS 2007, JIM forthcoming, TC forthcoming) and books (e.g. Goldstein 2007; Benito 
and Narula 2007). 
 
This paper takes stock of the mounting trend of outward FDI from emerging economies, with 
special focus on a group of five countries, which are becoming increasingly economically and 
politically influential, viz. the ‘BRICS’ countries. An ‘S’ is appended here to the conventional 
acronym of ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) to include the largest economy on the African 
continent, South Africa. The five BRICS countries produced some USD25 billion of outward FDI 
flows in 2004, corresponding to some 3 percent of world FDI flows and well over half (61 percent) 
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of total developing country outflows. OFDI from the BRICS countries has grown rapidly over the 
last few years, while still remaining modest compared to many developed countries.  
 
Following a brief discussion of FDI and emerging economies in general the article proceeds to 
hypothesise that the increase we currently observe in outward investment from emerging and 
developing economies may constitute a third ‘wave’ of OFDI, distinct from the two previous waves 
depicted in the literature, and outlines the contours of such a wave. An empirical analysis OFDI 
from the BRICS countries follows, conducted at three levels: global (what is the extent, directions, 
etc. of outward FDI); sectoral (in which sectors is outward FDI significant); and firm level, 
identifying a small number of particularly interesting TNCs from emerging and developing 
economies. 
 
FDI and emerging economies 
While the impact of FDI on host economies remains an important topic of scholarly attention, the 
policy position has generally shifted from being more sceptical in the 1970s enforcing a range of 
conditionalities on FDI, which in turn influenced firm-level internationalisation patterns and 
strategies, to a much more accommodating position from the 1990s onwards. These latter policies 
emphasised investment promotion and the provision of the best possible framework conditions for 
foreign investors, including infrastructure provision, fast track bureaucratic procedures, and 
different forms of subsidy and tax alleviation schemes. Interestingly, today OECD countries have 
begun to deliberate policies to provide those same kinds of incentives to TNCs from emerging and 
developing economies contemplating outward investment into the OECD. 
 
According to standard economic theory FDI inflows to a developing country increase its capital 
stock and raises the host country’s labour productivity, output, employment, and incomes 
(Blomström et al. 1996). In addition to these direct effects the literature suggests that further 
efficiency gains in the host economy accrue from the increased competition and discipline 
generated by foreign firms, from technological and managerial spillovers, and from learning-by-
doing effects in local suppliers (De Mello Jr. 1997; Huang 2004; Hirschman 1958). The financial 
flows involved are usually considered of secondary in importance to the transmission of ideas and 
technological, organisational, and business knowledge. This transmission takes place through the 
FDI operations; the production, employment, capital investment, and R&D of multinational firms. It 
takes place horizontally within industries where multinational firms operate and vertically across 
industries to supplier and customer industries, and from industries to consumers (Lipsey 2005). 
Export-oriented FDI by TNCs may also promote exports and economic growth by the establishment 
of assembly plants and by providing host country firms access to international markets for exports 
(Aitken and Harrison 1997; De Mello Jr. 1997; Zhang 2001).  
 
Most contemporary analyses and national development strategies tend to emphasise the positive 
potentials inherent in FDI and the East Asian countries’ successful combination of foreign 
technology transfers with export marketing have translated into a general case for strategies 
attempting to tap into foreign sources of technology (see for instance Wade 1995 and Lall 1995).1 
But the positive assessment is not unanimous and many debates remain unsettled. Some studies 
(Chakraborty and Basu 2002; De Mello Jr. 1997) suggest that the causality does not run from FDI 
                                                 
1 Different countries and regions have been able to benefit from FDI to very different extents, though. Southeast Asian 
models have been characterized as ‘technology-less’ (Yoshihara) as opposed to Northeast Asia’s more activist 
exploitation of the combination of foreign investment, local technology absorption and export marketing. Even though 
China appears to be experimenting with implementing several different of the Asian development models at the same 
time (Dodgson), China has generally vigorously pursued technology transfer agreements in exchange for market access 
in connection with inward foreign investment. 
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to GDP growth but rather in the opposite direction, from GDP to FDI, reflecting that FDI is often of 
the market-seeking variety (Dunning 1988) and attracted by growing local markets for services such 
as retail, telecommunications, and financial services (Mortimore 2004). FDI flows may even have 
negative effects on growth if TNCs apply technologies which do not accord with the host country’s 
factor endowments (e.g. too capital intensive), apply overly-sophisticated techniques and equipment 
that impede significant transfers from occurring, retain the most advanced segments of the value-
chain and the most advanced product lines in their home country, do not conduct R&D locally, 
perform substantial reverse transfers of remittances of profits and dividends, obtain excessive tax or 
other concessions from the host country, or require overly restrictive protection of and/or 
royalty/fee payments for their proprietary technology (cf. the recent Chinese case of prohibitive 
license fees for DVD decoder chip technology). Other occasionally voiced cautions are that FDI 
may worsen income distribution, increase ‘urban bias’, or squeeze local entrepreneurs out of the 
most dynamic sectors (see for instance Moran 1978; Doner 1991; Singer 1975).  
 
Finally there are studies which suggest that the impact of FDI on growth is contingent on other 
factors such as whether the country adopts an open trade regime (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996; 
Ram and Zhang 2002) or a diversity of other factors such as educational attainment, political 
stability, or the state of the financial system (UNCTAD 1999). What such contingencies are 
concerned, increasing attention is being paid to the issue of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). A growing literature suggests that the variations in growth effects of FDI can to a 
large part be explained by differences in the abilities on the receiving end to absorb the knowledge 
and technological potentials FDI provides (Keller 1996; Borensztein et al. 1998; Durham 2004; 
Olofsdotter 1998). Basically, the level of human capital development in the economy along with 
deliberate investments in learning-enhancing training and R&D at the firm level determines the 
ability to benefit from FDI. An interesting recent contribution to this line of argument has been 
made by Martin Bell and associates, arguing that spillovers are neither an automatic process 
inherent to FDI nor predominantly determined by the passive and incidental ‘absorptive capacities’ 
of local firms. Rather it is contingent on active efforts towards ‘technological accumulation’ on 
behalf of local firms and deliberate forging of linkages between foreign investors and local firms 
(Bell and Marin 2004). 
 
A strand of the general literature on FDI is particularly relevant to outward FDI from 
emerging/developing economies: Findlay (1978) argued that the extent to which spillovers will 
accrue from FDI depends on the difference in the level of technological complexity, or the 
‘technology gap’, between multinationals and local firms: the larger the difference, the larger the 
potential for spillovers. However, the opposite assumption is equally reasonable: gaps could be too 
large and technology and routines deployed by TNCs too remote from the host economy for any 
significant spillovers to occur (Taki 2005; Girma et al. 2001). If the latter is true South-South FDI 
may in this respect offer better developmental potentials than North-South FDI by applying more 
‘appropriate’ technologies, business models, and managerial and organisational techniques, which 
are better attuned to developing-economy circumstances. 
 
A confluence of factors, such as increasing wealth, trade and investment policy reforms, regional 
integration, loosening capital controls, progressing industrialisation, and build-up of firm-specific 
advantages of capabilities have led many developing countries to become a significant source of 
FDI, particularly to other developing countries (Battat & Aykut 2005). Since developing countries 
are typically scarce on capital and abundant on labour and faced with foreign exchange shortages 
there would be immediate economic arguments against engaging in large scale capital export, 
focusing instead on capital import. However, not least in order to build and maintain firm-level 
competitiveness, today many developing and emerging economy governments actively support the 
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internationalization of domestic firms through a range of supportive policies, especially in large 
emerging economies (Sauvant 2005; UNCTAD 2005b). 
 
Firms such as Daewoo, Hyundai and Samsung (Korea), Petrobras and Embraer (Brazil), Acer and 
Tatung (Taiwan) have become fully-fledged TNCs today. While TNCs flurry to China attracted by 
factor costs and market potentials, China’s own multinationals have begun to tap into even cheaper 
labour elsewhere. They are investing in bicycle production in Ghana and video players in South-
East Asia. Ramatex, a Malaysian textile firm, has built a plant in Namibia, from which it serves the 
world’s garment market (Economist 2005). Conventional wisdom holds that companies such as 
these from developing and emerging economies are significantly disadvantaged when trying to 
expand internationally. However, experiences from their home economy can provide a valuable 
springboard rather than a disadvantage: they are accustomed to demanding and price-sensitive 
customers and challenging distribution environments and this can enable them to develop the 
capabilities they need to also compete successfully elsewhere (Sinha 2005). In poor countries in 
specific, developing-country multinationals often do better than their developed-country rivals. 
While they are not as cash rich, they can operate with lower overheads, and while their technology 
may be less advanced, it is better suited to the countries in which they invest. They are also often 
closer to the host country, both geographically and culturally, and tend to be more accustomed to 
the risks of investing in countries with unpredictable political and regulatory environments and less-
stable economies (Economist 2005; Aykut and Ratha 2004). 
 
A third wave of OFDI? 
Many TNCs from emerging and developing economies (ETNCs) have gradually accumulated 
technological capabilities and firm specific advantages sufficient to expand their operations to other 
countries and flows of outward investment from emerging and developing economies have 
consequently increased significantly in quantitative terms. In addition however, when probing 
beneath the quantitative surface a number of important qualitative changes in the composition and 
structural characteristics of outward investment from the developing world are revealed. This 
becomes apparent when comparing the older and the newer literature on OFDI. Previously, up into 
the 1980s, emerging economy firms mainly invested abroad to establish trade supporting networks 
and to access markets. Access to natural resources abroad and escape from bureaucratic restrictions 
at home were other prominent motives. Investments were mainly in other developing countries, 
especially those with short psychic distance (geographic, cultural, ethnic, institutional). ETNCs 
typically entered with minority ownership and engaged in greenfield investments and in many 
countries the companies most active in outward investment were state owned. When investing in 
developed economies they were mainly active in ‘sunset’ industries with less fierce competition 
from developed country counterparts.  
 
From the 1990s onwards there were various shifts in the investment motives, modes of ownership, 
sectoral composition and typical destinations of OFDI (see also Pradhan and Liu in this volume): 
ETNCs were more frequently privately owned, even though a high degree of state ownership 
remains among the largest ETNCs, especially in natural resources. They more frequently took on 
majority ownership in outward investment projects and even though greenfield investments remain 
the dominant entry mode, international acquisitions became more frequent. Services became the 
dominant sector in OFDI (e.g. finance and business services) over manufacturing and natural 
resources. Even though the developing world remains the main destination of OFDI, investments 
became increasingly oriented towards developed rather than developing country destinations: 
reflecting also the cumulative increase in monopolistic advantages of ETNCs they increasingly 
invested to acquire technology, brands, and marketing capabilities in advanced economies. While a 
small number of countries remain responsible for the bulk of OFDI, there has also been a 
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diversification in terms of the number of emerging and developing economies engaging in outward 
investments on a larger scale. Access to markets remains the dominant motive, especially where 
regional and South-South investments are concerned and efficiency seeking is the second most 
important motive (UNCTAD 2006) but asset-seeking investments into developed economies 
became gradually important for the purpose of accessing technology, R&D and marketing 
capabilities, brands, distribution networks, and managerial and organizational competencies 
 
More generally and for analytical purposes, trends in outward investment from emerging and 
developing economies can be divided into three broad ‘waves’. Any such abstraction and division 
of time periods into discrete waves must necessarily be rather crude given the inherent national, 
industry and firm-level diversity in investment projects and flows. There are also many well-known 
limitations and inaccuracies associated with official FDI statistics: misclassification of capital flight 
and portfolio flows, misclassification of indirect outward investment by foreign affiliates, and other 
reporting and registration problems abound, and the problems are especially severe in developing-
country statistics. For these reasons the third wave of OFDI proposed in the following table is put 
forward as an informed hypothesis, pending closer empirical scrutiny, even though there does seem 
to be a sufficient extent of deviation from the received literature to propose a third and qualitative 
different ‘wave’. 
 
The investment development path framework (IDP), first put forward by John Dunning, suggests 
that ETNCs tend to initially invest in resource- and market-seeking activities in neighbouring or 
other developing countries, and then expand their presence worldwide (Aykut & Ratha 2004). The 
received literature suggests that there have been two different waves of outward FDI from 
developing countries (Dunning et al. 1996, 1998; UNCTAD 2005c): from the 1960s until early 
1980s, and thereafter. The first-wave firms were driven mainly by market- and efficiency-seeking 
factors and investments were mainly directed towards other developing countries, most often 
neighbouring countries. In the second wave, driven by a combination of pull and push factors, 
strategic-asset seeking also became a motive and investments into developed countries and 
developing countries outside the investor’s own region became more important. The first wave of 
FDI originated predominantly from Latin America where new TNCs emerged from Argentina, 
Mexico and Chile, followed by Brazilian, Colombian and Venezuelan competitors (Andreff 1987). 
During a period which otherwise emphasized industrialization strategies based on import 
substitution, Latin American TNCs internationalised on the basis of products that had met the needs 
of their growing domestic markets and outward FDI went primarily to neighbouring developing 
countries with similar demand structures. The second stage from the 1980s was dominated by Asian 
TNCs, spreading from Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and thereafter Malaysia, 
Thailand, China, India and the Philippines, and accompanied Asian countries’ export oriented 
industrialization strategies. Outward FDI from Latin America was less prominent during this period. 
Asian TNCs expanded mostly in the fast growing foreign markets of other NIEs but they also 
outward invested to access cheap labour in developing countries that were less developed than their 
home countries.  
 
Based on a recovery of Latin American outward FDI in the 1990s in the context of global 
competition in manufacturing and services, Chudnovsky and Lopez (2000) and Andreff (2003) 
proposes the emergence of a third wave of OFDI. At this stage the largest Asian TNCs already 
competed with Western TNCs, invested into developed countries, and some countries were 
becoming net FDI exporters (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan), a position traditionally reserved 
for developed countries (Andreff 2003). However, the third wave suggested by Chudnovsky, Lopez, 
and Andreff is mainly generalizing from and focusing on outward investments from Latin America. 
We propose here the emergence of a different and more general third wave of OFDI. Based on the 
BRICS-based contributions in this special issue as well as other available evidence, the deviations 
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from the two previous waves described in the literature appear to be sufficiently significant to 
suggest the emergence of a third wave, which is not confined to Latin America but applies to 
outward investment flows from emerging and developing countries in general. The three waves are 
summarised in Table 1. Each wave retains most of the features from the previous one but some 
features are added and others revised. It is also important to note that the waves are broad, ‘ideal 
typical’, and aggregate abstractions. At present time for example, any individual developing 
economy or any individual ETNC may well predominantly exhibit the features of one of the two 
previous waves. 
 
Table 1  Three waves of outward FDI 
 
 First Second Third 
Period 1960s to mid-1980s Mid-1980s to 1990s 1990s to 2000s 
Outward investing 
region/country 
group 
Especially Latin America Especially Asia More geographically diverse 
country origins 
Resurgence of Latin America 
Inclusion of Russia and South 
Africa 
Country examples, 
largest outward 
investors 
Brazil, Argentina, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Venezuela, 
Philippines, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Colombia, Mexico, 
India 
Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, 
Malaysia 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Brazil, South Africa, China, 
Korea, Malaysia, Argentina, 
Russia, Chile, Mexico 
Destinations Mainly other developing 
countries in same region 
Mainly developing countries, but 
also to more distant locations, 
including developed economies
Increasingly global 
(Knowledge-intensive) services 
mainly regional destinations 
Mature sectors increasingly 
also into developed economies
Types of outward 
FDI 
Primary sector 
Small-scale manufacturing 
Into developing: primary sector, 
difficult-to-trade services 
(finance, infrastructure) 
Into developed: mature, cost-
competitive industries 
(automotives, electronics, IT 
services), asset-augmenting 
investments 
As 2nd wave, but with more 
going into developed 
economies 
 Mainly horizontal Horizontal and vertical Horizonal and vertical 
Ownership 
advantages 
Home country specific Home country and firm specific Home country and firm specific 
 Low cost inputs 
Production process capabilities
Networks and relationships 
(e.g. ethnic) 
Organizational structure (e.g. 
conglomerates) 
‘Appropriate’ technology, 
business models, and 
management 
Same as 1st wave Now also: 
Economies of scale 
Technological, managerial, and 
organizational capabilities 
Vertical control over 
factor/product markets 
Motivation Resource and market seeking 
 
Into developing: resource and 
market seeking 
Into developed: market and 
asset seeking 
As 2nd wave, but increase in 
asset seeking 
 Asset exploitation Asset exploitation 
Minor asset augmentation 
Also asset augmentation 
Market power enhancing 
(especially natural resource 
related) 
Policy regime Import substitution Export orientation Schumpeterian 
 FDI regulation FDI coordination and facilitation FDI promotion 
Source: Dunning et al. 1996, 1998, Lall 1983, Chudnovsky  and Lopez 2000, Andreff 2003, UNCTAD 2006, plus own 
revisions and additions, particularly the third wave. 
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Outward FDI flows from BRICS 
We return now to the issue of outward investment flows from the BRICS countries in specific. 
What has been the magnitude of these flows and stocks, in which sectors are they significant, and 
which are major outward investing firms? The empirical analysis in the following is conducted at 
three levels: global, sectoral, and firm level. 
 
Table 2 shows the total FDI net outflows from developed (high-income) and developing (low and 
middle-income) countries, as well as the world total over time. The time series reveals the 
emergence of multinationals from emerging and developing economies and shows a significant 
increase in FDI originating from low and middle income countries, from USD797 million in 1980 
to USD41,688 million in year 2004. FDI outflows from developing countries as a percentage of 
world outflows fluctuates but shows an increasing trend throughout the period and reaches 4.8% of 
the world total in year 2004. 
 
Table 2  FDI net outflows by country income group, 1980-2004 (current USD mio & percent) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 average 2000-2004 
World 60,856 64,272 253,432 341,182 1,361,869 641,576 864,205 855,580 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
High income 55,812 60,775 242,552 327,498 1,335,997 605,190 795,589 820,273 
 91.7% 94.6% 95.7% 96.0% 98.1% 94.3% 92.1% 95.9% 
Middle income 847 1,118 2,872 11,964 16,926 25,777 36,815 21,788 
 1.4% 1.7% 1.1% 3.5% 1.2% 4.0% 4.3% 2.7% 
Low income 8 17 5 139 647 1,694 - 1,568 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% - 0.2% 
Low & middle income 797* 1,109 2,810 12,272 17,785 27,763 41,688 24,144 
 1.3% 1.7% 1.1% 3.6% 1.3% 4.3% 4.8% 3.0% 
Source: Calculated from World Bank data, based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of 
Payments databases. 
* ‘Low & middle income’ is less than the sum of ‘Middle income’ and ‘Low income’ due to inaccuracies in the underlying database. 
 
Table 3 shows FDI outflows from the BRICS countries in specific over the period from 1980 to 
2004. There has been a steady increase of total FDI outflow from BRICS over the last decade with 
the fastest growth in the period from 2002 to 2004. A peak of USD25.4 billion was reached in year 
2004; more than three times the total in 2000.  
 
Table 3  FDI net outflows by country, 1980 - 2004 (current USD mio) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 Average 2000-2004 
Brazil 367 81 665 1,384 2,282 249 9,471 2,445 
Russian Federation - - - 605 3,177 9,727 10,346 5,863 
India - - - 117 510 1,324 2,222 1,426 
China - 629 830 2,000 916 -152 1,805 2,394 
South Africa - 47 28 2,494 277 565 1,583 -298 
Total BRICS 367 757 1,523 6,600 7,161 11,714 25,427 11,831 
Denmark - 306 1,482 2,969 28,381 856 -9,930 7,022 
European Monetary Union 15,229 13,482 95,456 102,849 631,975 273,444 255,958 362,973 
Germany 4,690 5,786 24,483 39,100 59,744 -4,899 -8,101 20,358 
Japan 2,390 6,492 50,497 22,508 31,534 28,766 30,958 32,354 
United Kingdom 11,229 10,606 20,124 45,305 245,376 64,090 80,239 99,767 
United States 19,230 14,060 37,200 98,780 159,212 140,580 252,013 169,722 
Source: As above. 
* UNCTAD 
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Brazil was the most important source country for FDI from the Latin American region in 2002, with 
outflows of USD 2.5 billion. Outflows fell sharply in 2003, reflecting the overall poor performance 
of the region. In 2004, however, they rebounded sharply placing Brazil among the top five investors 
in the developing countries (UNCTAD 2004). For Russia, the ratio between outward and inward 
FDI is considerably higher than any of other CEE countries due to rapid growth in Russian OFDI 
(UNCTAD 2005a). Indian enterprises have been investing abroad for a long time but even though 
the total amount of Indian OFDI has increased it remains modest compared to the other BRICS 
countries. Chinese levels of OFDI were insignificant before 1985. Today the scale of China’s OFDI 
is still small compared with large developed-country outward investors but the trend is upwards and 
China’s peak annual OFDI of USD7 billion in 2001 compares with USD3.5 billion for South Korea 
and USD1.4 billion for India (UNCTAD 2003b; Liu et al. 2005). South Africa is the single largest 
source of OFDI from Africa and OFDI has been driven largely by investment in resources as well 
as by investment opportunities in neighbouring countries as a result of privatizations (UNCTAD 
2005c). 
 
As we saw above FDI, in absolute terms outflows from BRICS have increased rapidly over the last 
few years. We turn next to the question of whether they have also increased in terms of their 
relative size compared to global FDI outflows and outflows from the developing world. 
 
Table 4  BRICS FDI outflows as percent of world and developing country outflows, 1995-2004 
(current USD mio and percent) 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average 2000-2004 
World 341,182 1,361,869 739,607 670,641 641,576 864,205 855,580 
Low & middle income 12,272 17,785 15,285 18,201 27,763 41,688 24,144 
BRICS 6,600 7,161 5,042 9,809 11,714 25,427 11,831 
 % of World 1.93% 0.53% 0.68% 1.46% 1.83% 2.94% 1.44% 
 % of Low & middle i. 53.78% 40.27% 32.99% 53.89% 42.19% 60.99% 46.07% 
Source: As above. 
 
Over the period 2000-2004 FDI outflows from the BRICS countries constituted close to half (46%) 
of FDI outflows from developing countries (Table 4), fluctuating between a low of 33% in 2001 
and a high of 61% in 2004. In other words, in 2004 FDI outflows from BRICS account for well 
over half of total outflows from developing countries. Relative to world outflows, FDI outflows 
from BRICS account for an average 1.4% of the total over the period 2000-2004, with the lowest 
share being a half percent in year 2000 and the highest 2.9% in 2004. BRICS outflows as a share of 
total outflows increased steadily throughout the period, while outflows as a percentage of 
developing world outflows fluctuate somewhat but displays a clear increasing trend.  
 
Table 5 controls for the different sizes of the BRICS economies and displays FDI outflows as a 
percentage of GDP. 
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Table 5  FDI net outflows by country, 1970-2004 (percent of GDP) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average 2000-2004 
Brazil .. 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.5 0.0 1.6 0.418 
Russian 
Federation .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 1.2 0.8 1.0 2.3 1.8 1.421 
India .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 .. 0.191 
China .. .. .. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.171 
South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.2 -3.0 -0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.407 
Denmark .. 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.6 17.9 8.3 1.5 0.4 -4.1 4.811 
European 
Monetary Union .. 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.7 1.4 10.3 5.5 4.6 3.3 2.7 5.283 
Germany .. 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.4 1.5 3.1 2.1 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 1.101 
Japan .. .. 0.2 0.5 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.747 
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.0 4.0 17.1 4.2 3.2 3.6 3.8 6.346 
United States 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 2.2 1.592 
Source: Calculated from World Bank data, based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of 
Payments databases, World Bank, Global Development Finance, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
 
As the table shows, relative to GDP FDI outflows from the BRICS countries are still modest 
compared to many developed economies. Among the BRICS countries Russia has the largest FDI 
outflows relative to GDP, with a peak of 2.3% in 2003. In terms of the 2000-2004 average, Russia 
and Brazil are the largest outward investors. South Africa had negative outflows in 2001 and 2002 
resulting in negative average 2000-2004.  
 
Turning next to FDI outward stocks rather than flows, the total outward FDI stock from BRICS 
were USD220 billion in 2004 (Table 6). 
 
Table 6  FDI outward stock by country, 1980 – 2004 (USD mio) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 
Brazil 38,545 39,439 41,044 44,474 51,946 54,423 54,892 64,363 
Russian 
Federation .. .. .. 345 20,141 54,608 72,273 81,874 
India 78 93 124 495 1,859 4,005 5,054 6,592 
China .. 900 4,455 17,768 27,768 37,172 37,020 38,825 
South Africa 5,543 8,905 15,027 23,305 32,333 21,980 27,184 28,790 
Total BRICS    86,386 134,047 172,188 196,423 220,444 
European Union 212,572 302,830 805,851 1,296,291 3,046,301 3,715,099 4,726,873 5,189,738 
United States 215,375 238,369 430,521 699,016 1,316,247 1,601,414 1,788,911 2,018,205 
Japan 19,610 43,970 201,441 238,452 278,442 304,237 335,500 370,544 
United Kingdom 80,434 100,313 229,307 304,865 897,845 994,136 1,235,898 1,378,130 
Germany 43,127 59,909 151,581 268,418 541,861 695,765 840,918 833,651 
Denmark 2,065 1,801 7,342 - 73,106 86,679 102,596 99,570 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 
 
The largest outward investor in terms of stock is Russia followed by Brazil. India’s outward stock is 
relatively small compared to the other four countries. Total outward stock for BRICS grew by a 
factor 2.5 from 1995 to 2004. 
 
Outward stock grew particularly quickly for Russia through this period, but also for India and 
China. The recent statistical updates by the Russian Government confirm previous estimations of 
large amounts of Russian capital abroad. Unlike in most of the economies in transition, capital 
outflows from the Russian Federation have repeatedly exceeded capital inflows. Some part of the 
significant increase in OFDI stock from Russia is attributed to an improved data registering system, 
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however. South Africa’s OFDI stock of USD29 billion in 2004 accounted for 67% of the region’s 
OFDI stock (UNCTAD 2005c).  
 
BRICS outward stocks constituted 2.3% of the world’s total stocks in 2004 and 21% of total from 
developing countries (see Table 7). Comparing this to the fact that outward flows from BRICS 
constituted well over half of developing country outflows in 2004 suggests that the significant 
increase in BRICS outflows is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
 
Table 7  Outward FDI stock by country group, 1980 - 2004 (USD mio and percent) 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 
World 570,125 752,841 1,785,264 2,917,546 6,148,284 7,288,417 8,731,240 9,732,233 
Developed countries 496,197 663,312 1,637,760 2,581,190 5,257,261 63,68,560 7,727,178 8,610,146 
Developing countries 73,927 89,529 147,313 334,720 868,920 861,568 927,442 1,035,676 
BRICS    86,386 134,047 172,188 196,423 220,444 
 % of World    2.96% 2.18% 2.36% 2.25% 2.27% 
 % of Developed    3.35% 2.55% 2.70% 2.54% 2.56% 
 % of Developing    25.81% 15.43% 19.99% 21.18% 21.29% 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 
 
Relative to GDP (see Table 8), Russia was the largest outward investor in 2004, closely followed by 
South Africa, while the shares of India and China are comparatively small (1.0% and 2.4%). As an 
average over 2000-2004, South Africa was the largest outward investor when seen relative to GDP. 
South Africa excepted, seen over the period 2000-2004 the BRICS countries’ outward stock as a 
share of GDP is lower than the average for all developing countries.2
 
Table 8  Outward FDI stock as a share GDP, 1980 - 2004 (percent) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 average 2000-2004 
Brazil 16.4 17.7 8.8 6.3 8.6 11.8 11.4 10.7 10.5 
Russian Federation .. .. .. 0.1 7.8 15.8 16.7 14.0 13.0 
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.7 
China .. 0.3 1.3 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.7 
South Africa 6.9 15.6 13.4 15.4 25.3 20.7 17.0 13.5 18.4 
World 5.8 6.6 8.7 10.0 19.7 22.7 24.3 24.0 22.4 
Developed countries 6.2 7.2 9.6 11.2 21.5 25.3 27.3 27.3 25.0 
Developing countries 4.1 4.1 4.3 6.1 13.6 13.5 13.4 12.7 13.4 
European Union 6.0 10.4 11.5 14.5 37.0 41.0 43.0 40.9 40.2 
United States 7.8 5.7 7.5 9.5 13.5 15.4 16.5 17.2 15.4 
Japan 1.8 3.2 6.6 4.5 5.8 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.3 
United Kingdom 15.0 22.0 23.2 26.9 62.4 63.5 68.7 64.8 64.1 
Germany 4.6 8.4 9.0 10.9 29.0 35.0 35.0 30.8 32.6 
Denmark 3.0 3.0 5.5 .. 46.1 50.1 48.4 41.1 47.0 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 
 
Recipients of outward FDI from BRICS 
As discussed earlier, TNCs from emerging and developing economies (ETNCs) tend to invest close 
to their home country and where they have acquired a certain familiarity through trade, or ethnic 
and cultural ties. It has been estimated that by the end of the past decade, more than a third of the 
FDI going to developing countries came from their peers (Economist 2005). In third wave of OFDI, 
though, ETNCs are increasingly venturing beyond their immediate region. Latin American and 
                                                 
2 UNCTAD’s definition of ‘developing countries’ also includes high-income countries in the South (e.g. Singapore). 
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Asian investments are venturing into Africa, Asian investments into Latin America and vice versa. 
More recently, Chinese and Indian firms have acquired high value assets in the US and EU 
countries (Battat & Aykut 2005), often under considerable media attention.  
 
In the case of Brazil, other Latin American countries as well as the U.S., are the most prominent 
destinations of outward FDI. Chile and Venezuela are prominent Latin American recipients. A good 
part of outward capital movement from Brazil appears to involve capital flows seeking shelter from 
taxation or undertaking currency transactions, and countries such as Bahamas, Bermuda, and the 
British Virgin Islands accounted for about 70% of Brazil’s total FDI outward stock in 2003. In 
terms of market-seeking investments, the main markets targeted are Western European countries, 
the United States and Mexico (UNCTAD 2004).  
 
Russian OFDI is mainly directed towards the traditional neighbouring host countries such as 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Europe and CEE. At the same time OFDI in non-
traditional locations such as Australia, Africa, the European Union and the United States is 
increasing. About half of Russian OFDI stock is believed to be in the European Union, while the 
CIS and the United States each accounted for about a one-fifth share (Kalotay 2003; UNCTAD 
2005a).  
 
Indian OFDI was during the period from 1975 to 1990 more concentrated in other developing 
countries, which may suggest that Indian firms were not yet able to compete with industrialized 
TNCs. Competition from TNCs within India is also likely to have been a contributing factor to 
outward investments. Other main motives for outward investments were to escape from a restrictive 
business environment in terms of government regulations, the high costs of domestic and imported 
inputs, and the desire to exploit the growing markets of host countries. Especially during the first 
wave, proximity in geography, languages, history and ethnicity had strong impact on the location 
decision of Indian outward investors. Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Malaysia took the lion’s 
share of OFDI in services from India during 1975-90. During the second wave, Indian OFDI moved 
towards industrialized countries in terms of locations (Pradhan 2005) and where OFDI in services is 
concerned by the 1990s most was concentrated in developed countries such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The top 15 Indian IT software and related service companies have all 
invested abroad, mostly in developed countries (Hindu Business Line 2004). The most crucial 
destinations of Indian outward FDI to date are the U.S., which accounts for 19% of total cumulative 
outflows during 1996-2003 and the Russian Federation, with 18% of the cumulative outflows. Two 
tax havens, Bermuda and British Virgin Islands, together account for 11% of cumulative outward 
FDI followed by Mauritius (9%). A double taxation avoidance treaty between India and Mauritius 
appears to have encouraged Indian firms to ‘round trip’ investment through Mauritius and other tax 
haven countries to take advantage of the tax benefits enjoyed by overseas investors.  
 
Most Chinese OFDI is directed towards other developing countries, not only in Asia but also in 
Africa and Latin America (UNCTAD 2005c). So far, the quest to acquire foreign mining, oil, and 
gas assets has dominated the buying spree. Chinese companies have acquired a wide range of 
assets, though often at considerable premiums, and run them successfully, particularly in emerging 
markets. Western markets have been more difficult to enter. Some Chinese bids to take over raw 
material assets and consumer goods companies have failed, partly because of opposition from 
Western stakeholders (McKinsey 2006). 
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Sectoral composition of outward FDI from BRICS 
South-South FDI flows are highly concentrated in the infrastructure and extractive sectors, mostly 
in the form of large M&A and privatization deals. Between 1998 and 2003, ETNCs contributed 
almost USD30 billion in infrastructure projects in developing countries. Extractive sectors have 
attracted a large amount of ETNCs because of three factors: (1) national oil companies from the 
emerging economies are leading players in the market because of their exclusive access to oil 
reserves; (2) most of the population and economic growth is taking place in the developing world 
and to ensure access to additional resources and ensure their long-term supply, countries try to 
acquire assets in other countries; (3) some oil and gas ETNCs such as Petrobras and Petronas 
leverage their advanced technological capacity, such as deep-water exploration, in order to gain 
global presence in the sector (Battat & Aykut 2005). 
  
Table 9  Main outward investing industries by country 
Country Industries 
Brazil Energy, mining, services 
Russia Oil, gas, metal, manufacturing and telecommunication 
India Pharmaceuticals, agricultural inputs, software, IT and broadcasting 
China Trade and services, manufacturing, resource extraction (oil, gas, minerals), IT 
South Africa Resource extraction and finance 
 
Table 9 lists the most important outward investing industries for each of the BRICS countries. FDI 
in services from Brazil reflects the large investments in offshore financial centres in the Caribbean, 
as well as trade-related and transport services. FDI in primary activities is negligible and relatively 
low in manufacturing, accounting for under 3% of total outward stock in 2003, and was 
concentrated in food, beverages and tobacco, petroleum and other fuel products, and metal 
(UNCTAD 2004). Russian resource-based enterprises in the oil, gas, and metal industries are the 
the most active with OFDI. However, manufacturing and telecommunication enterprises are also 
investing extensively abroad (UNCTAD 2005a). Half of India’s OFDI in 1999-2004 was in 
manufacturing (especially fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, drugs and pharmaceuticals), followed by 
non-financial services, including IT services and business process outsourcing (UNCTAD 2005c).  
There has been a trend towards outward investments in more knowledge-intensive industries such 
as drugs and pharmaceuticals, software, and broadcasting (Pradhan 2005). A significant portion of 
China’s OFDI value is in resource extraction activities (oil, natural gas, and minerals), dominated 
by state-owned enterprises. There are also growing investments in trade and services, especially, in 
computer-related industries and information technology (Liu et al. 2005; UNCTAD 2005c). Most of 
South African enterprises that have internationalized are large firms in resource and finance 
industries. 
 
TNCs from BRICS 
There were altogether more than 1,000 Brazilian firms that had invested abroad (TNCs) in the late 
1990s. Petrobras (petroleum and natural gas), Companhia Vale de Rio Doce (mining and quarrying) 
and some engineering services firms and a few Brazilian banks were the first to invest in 
neighboring countries in the 1970s. But generally, Brazilian firms have so far been cautious in 
expanding abroad. Many have internationalized a significant share of their output through exports 
rather than through investments. This is not surprising given that outward FDI normally does not 
come in the early stages of a company’s internationalization, even in the case of seasoned Brazilian 
exporters (UNCTAD 2004).  
 
Russian OFDI is predominantly by large firms. The role of SMEs in internationalization has been 
limited and they tend to operate closer to home, in the CIS and CEE markets. A strategy to improve 
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competitiveness of Russian oil enterprises is to undertake OFDI to internalize or control the value 
chain internationally (UNCTAD 2005a). Major outward investors include Lukoil (oil and gas), 
Gazprom (oil and gas), JSC Novoship (Shipping), Norilsk (Non-ferrous metals), Primorsk Shipping 
Corporation and the Far East Shipping Company (UNCTAD 2005c).  
 
Examples of Indian companies with large outward investments are in IT (Wipro and Infosys), 
manufacturing (Tata), pharmaceuticals (Ranbaxy) and natural resources (ONGC-Videsh). Many 
Indian SMEs also are expanding abroad, e.g. Roto Pumps. Other SMEs with successful overseas 
ventures include B4U Multimedia International (music entertainment channels in 50 countries), 
Cipla Ltd. (a small drug manufacturer) and ACE Laboratories (a pharmaceutical firm) (UNCTAD 
2005c). 
 
Even though, as we saw above, recent outflows from China have been modest compared to other 
BRICS countries, in 2001 China provided 12 of the 50 largest TNCs from developing countries. 
Large Chinese OFDI projects included the China National Petroleum Corporation’s joint venture 
with Government of Sudan to produce oil as the Greater Nile Operating Company, and the 
Shanghai Huayuan Group Corporation’s purchase of a French textile company in Nigeria (Liu et al. 
2005). Other examples are enterprises such as Haier in white goods industries and Huawei 
Technologies in electronics and IT activities. These enterprises have also invested in overseas R&D 
activities (e.g. in India, Sweden, Singapore, U.K., U.S.). Other electronics companies have made 
acquisitions abroad e.g. the merger of TCL with the TV and DVD operations of Thomson in France 
and Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC division. Not just large Chinese enterprises but SMEs too 
are investing abroad. Many factors drive the overseas expansion of Chinese enterprises. China’s 
government has loosened foreign-currency controls, streamlined the approval process for overseas 
investments, and encouraged banks to provide capital. Private equity firms, mainly from the West, 
are offering access to additional capital and proposing investment opportunities to Chinese business 
leaders. Moreover Chinese business leaders increasingly believe that international expansion is an 
essential stepping-stone for growth (McKinsey 2006). 
 
Notable success stories of South African TNCs include AngloGold Ashanti (gold production), 
Illovo Sugar (sugar production in South Africa and in neighboring countries), Mondi (paper 
production) Steinhoff (furniture manufacturing) and the MTN group (cellular phone services). 
There are also small- and medium-sized South African enterprises investing abroad such as 
Spanjaard Ltd., Metorex, DPI Plastics (UNCTAD 2005c).  
 
Conclusion 
With the progress of globalization and changes in policy orthodoxy, foreign investments have 
become an increasingly important component in the economic strategies of firms and countries 
alike. Even though world investment flows are still heavily dominated by flows within the Triad, 
outward investments from emerging and developing economies (OFDI) has increased significantly 
in recent years. A deeper probing into the features of OFDI revealed recent shifts in the investment 
motives, modes of ownership, sectoral composition and typical destinations of OFDI; shifts 
sufficiently large to warrant the proposition of a new and qualitatively different ‘third wave’ of 
OFDI, different from the two previous waves depicted in the literature. 
 
For each of the five BRICS countries we took a closer look at the historical and contemporary 
trends in their outward investment flows. Out of the five countries, Russia has become the largest 
outward investor in terms of stock, followed by Brazil and China. The table below summarises 
some main characteristics of OFDI from each country. 
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Table 10  Summary of outward FDI from BRICS 
 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Outward stock 2004 
(USD billion) 64.4 81.9 6.6 38.8 28.8 
 - share of GDP 10.7% 14.0% 1.0% 2.4% 13.5% 
Average outflows 
2000-2004 (USD 
billion) 
2.4 5.9 1.4 2.4 -0.3 
 - share of GDP 0.42% 1.42% 0.19% 0.17% -0.41% 
Sectors 
Energy, mining, 
services 
Resource extraction 
(oil, gas, metal), 
manufacturing, 
telecom 
Pharmaceuticals, 
agricultural inputs 
manufacturing, 
software, IT services, 
broadcasting 
Trade, services, 
manufacturing, 
resource extraction 
(oil, gas, minerals), 
IT 
Resource 
extraction, finance 
Recipients Latin America, tax 
havens (Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, 
…), US, UK, 
Portugal, 
Netherlands 
European Union, 
CIS, US, CEE 
US, Russia, tax 
havens (Bermuda, 
…), Southeast Asia, 
Sri Lanka, UK 
HK, US, Japan, 
Australia, Germany 
Neighboring 
countries 
Example TNCs 
Petrobras, 
Odebrecht, Embraer 
Lukoil JSC, Norilsk 
Nickel, Novoship Co.
NIIT Ltd., Usha 
Martin, Ranbaxy 
China Ocean 
Shipping Grp.; China 
National Offshore Oil 
Corp.; China 
National Cereals, 
Oils & Foodstuffs 
Corp., Lenovo 
Illovo Sugar, MTN, 
AngloGold Ltd. 
Notes TNCs tend to rely 
more on exports 
than FDI 
Outflows repeatedly 
higher than inflows   
Single largest 
source of OFDI from 
Africa 
Source: UNCTAD 2004; UNCTAD 2005a; Pradhan 2005; Deng 2004; Spicer 2006; UNCTAD 2005c, World Bank and 
UN statistics 
 
References 
Andreff, V. (2003), ‘The newly emerging TNCs from economies in transition: a comparison with 
Third World outward FDI’, Transnational Corporations, Vol.12, No.2 (August). 
Agarwal, J.P. (1985), Pros and Cons of Third World Multinationals: A Case Study of India, 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr and Paul Siebeck. 
Aitken, B.G.H. and A. Harrison (1997), ‘Spillovers, foreign investment, and export behavior’, 
Journal of International Economics, 43, pp. 103–132. 
Aykut D., D. Ratha (2004)., ‘South-South FDI Flows: how big are they?’ Transnational 
Corporations, Vol.13, No.1 (April). 
Balasubramanyam, V.N., M. Salisu and D. Sapsford (1996), ‘Foreign direct investment and growth 
in EP and IS countries’, Economic Journal, 106 (1), pp. 92–105. 
Battat J., D. Aykut (2005), ‘Southern Multinationals, A Growing Phenomenon’, Foreign Investment 
Advisory Services (FIAS), October. 
Bell, M. and A. Marin (2004), ‘Where do FDI-related Technology Spillovers Come From in 
Emerging Economies? An exploration in Argentina in the 1990s’, The European Journal of 
Development Research, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 645-677. 
Benito, G. and R. Narula (eds.) (2007), Multinationals on the Periphery, PalgraveMacmillan. 
Blomström, M., R. Lipsey and M. Zejan (1996), ‘Is fixed investment the key to economic growth?’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1), pp. 269–276. 
Borensztein, E., J. Gregorio and J. Lee (1998), ‘How does foreign direct investment affect 
economic growth’, Journal of International Economics, 45 (1), pp. 115–135. 
Bulatov, A. (1998), ‘Russian Direct Investment Abroad: Main Motives in the Post-Soviet Period’, 
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
 14
Cai, K.G. (1999), ‘Outward foreign direct investment: A novel dimension of China´s integration 
into the regional and global economy’, The China Quarterly, 160: 856-880. 
Chakraborty, C. and P. Basu (2002), ‘Foreign direct investment and growth in India: A 
cointegration approach’, Applied Economics, 34, pp. 1061–1074. 
Chudnovsky, D. and A. López (2000), ‘A third wave of FDI from developing countries: Latin 
American TNCs in the 1990s’, Transnational Corporations, Vol.9, No.2: 31-75. 
Cohen, W. and D. Levinthal (1990), Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 128-152. 
De Mello Jr., L.R. (1997), ‘Foreign direct investment in developing countries and growth: A 
selective survey’, Journal of Development Studies, 34, pp. 1–34. 
Deng P. (2004), ‘Outward investment by Chinese MNCs: motivations and implications’, Business 
Horizons, 3/47. 
Doner, R.F. (1991), ‘Approaches to the politics of economic growth in Southeast Asia’, Journal of 
Asian Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4. 
Dunning, J.H.  (1988), Explaining International Production, London: Harper and Collins. 
Durham, J.B. (2004), ‘Absorptive capacity and the effects of foreign direct investment and equity 
foreign portfolio investment on economic growth’, European Economic Review, 48 (2), pp. 285–
306. 
Dunning J.H., R. van Hoesel and R. Narula (1996), ‘Explaining the “new” wave of outward FDI 
from developing countries: The case of Taiwan and Korea’, Research Memoranda 009, 
Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. 
Dunning, J.H., R. van Hoesel and R. Narula (1998), ‘Third World Multinationals Revisited: New 
Developments and Theoretical Implications’ in J.H. Dunning (ed), Globalization, Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment, Pergamon. 
Economist, The (2005), ‘Globalization with a third-world face’, 7 April. 
Girma, S., D. Greenaway and K. Wakelin (2001), ‘Who benefits from foreign direct investment in 
the UK?’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48 (2), pp. 119–133. 
Goldstein, A. and T.M. Shaw (2007), Multinational Companies from Emerging Economies: 
Composition, Conceptualization and Direction in the Global Economy, PalgraveMacmillan. 
Hindu Business Line, The (2004), ‘FDI outflow rises as Indian cos clinch more buys overseas: 
UNCTAD’, 23 October, www.thehindubusinessline.com 
Hirschman, A. D. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press. 
Huang Jr., T. (2004), ‘Spillovers from FDI in China’, Contemporary Economic Policy, 22 pp. 13–
25. 
JIBS (2007), International Expansion of Emerging Market Businesses, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Special Issue, 38(4). 
JIM (forthcoming), Journal of International Management, special issue on ‘Third-World 
Multinationals and Global Competition’. 
Keller, W. (1996), ‘Absorptive capacity: on the creation and acquisition of technology in 
development’, Journal of Development Economics, 49(1), pp. 199–227. 
Kalotay, K. (2003), ‘Outward Foreign Direct Investment From Economies in Transition in a Global 
Context’, Journal for East European Management Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 6-24. 
Kokko, A. (1994), ‘Technology, market characteristics and spillovers’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 43, pp. 279–293. 
Lall, S. (1983), The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises, New York: 
Wiley. 
Lall, S. (1995), ‘Industrial strategy and policies on foreign direct investment in East Asia’, 
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 4, No. 3 (December). 
Lecraw, D.J. (1977), ‘Direct Investment by Firms from Less Developed Countries’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, pp. 442-457. 
 15
Lecraw, D.J. (1993), ‘Outward Direct Investment by Indonesian Firms: Motivation and Effects’, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 24(3): 589-600. 
Lipsey, R.E. (2005), ‘UNCTAD, Expert Meeting on Capacity building in the Area of FDI: Data 
Compilation and Policy Formulation in Developing Countries’, 12-14 December. 
Liu, X., T. Buck, and C. Shu (2005), ‘Chinese economic development’, International Business 
Review, Vol.14, Issue 1, February, pp. 97-115 
McKinsey (2006), ‘Helping China’s companies master global M&A’, The McKinsey Quarterly, 
August  
Moran, T.H. (1978), ‘Multinational corporations and dependency: a dialogue for dependentistas and 
non-dependentistas’, International Organization, 32 (Winter), 79-100. 
Mortimore, M. (2004) ‘The impact of TNC strategies on development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’, in D. W. Te Velde (ed.), Foreign Direct Investment and Development: selected 
experiences and policy implications, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Olofsdotter, K. (1998), ‘Foreign direct investment, country capabilities and economic growth’, 
Weltwitschaftliches Archive, 134 (3), pp. 534–547 
Pradhan J.P. (2005), ‘Outward foreign direct investment from India: Recent Trends and Patterns’, 
Working paper No.153, Gujarat Institute of Development Research, February 
Ram, R. and K.H. Zhang (2002), ‘Foreign direct investment and economic growth: Evidence from 
cross-country data for the 1990s’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, pp. 205–
215. 
Sauvant, K.P. (2005), ‘New Sources of FDI: The BRICs’, Journal of World Investment & Trade, 
Vol. 6, No. 5, October, pp. 639-709. 
Singer, H. (1975), The Strategy of International Development, New York: International Arts and 
Science Press. 
Sinha J. (2005), ‘Global Champions from emerging markets’, The McKinsey Quarterly 2005, No. 2 
Sjöholm, F. (1999), ‘Technology gap, competition and spillovers from direct investment: Evidence 
from establishment Data’, Journal of Development Studies, 36 (1), pp. 53–73. 
Spicer, M. (2006), ‘South African Multinationals and Economic Development in Africa’, 
Presentation to conference on emerging multinationals, OECD Conference Centre, Paris, 27 
March. 
Taki, S. (2005), ‘Productivity spillovers and characteristics of foreign multinational plants in 
Indonesian manufacturing 1990–1995’, Journal of Development Economics, 76, pp. 521–542. 
TC forthcoming, Transnational Corporations, special issue on outward investment from the South, 
planned for 2008. 
Tolentino, P.E. (1993), Technological Innovation and Third World Multinationals, London & New 
York: Routledge. 
UNCTAD (1999), Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development, World Investment 
Report 1999, Geneva: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2004), Outward FDI from Brazil: poised to take off?, 7 December. 
UNCTAD (2005a), Case study on outward foreign direct investment by Russian enterprises, 8 
November. 
UNCTAD (2005b), ‘Firms in developing countries rapidly expanding foreign investment 
transnational activities’, press release, 30 May. 
UNCTAD (2005c), ‘Internationalization of developing-country enterprises through outward foreign 
direct investment’, 2 November 
UNCTAD (2006), FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 
World Investment Report 2006, Geneva: United Nations. 
van Hoesel, R. (1999), ‘New Multinational Enterprises from Korea and Taiwan: Beyond Export-led 
Growth’, New York: Routledge. 
Wade, R. (1995), ‘Lessons from East Asia’, in Stuart Corbridge (ed.), Development Studies: A 
Reader, London: Edward Arnold. 
 16
Wells, L.T. (1983), Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment from Developing 
Countries, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Yeung, H. (ed.) (2000), The Globalization of Business Firms from Emerging Economies, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Zhang, K.H.  (2001), ‘Does foreign direct investment promote economic growth? Evidence from 
East Asia and Latin America’, Contemporary Economic Policy, 19(2), pp. 175–185. 
 
 17
